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Abstract: In this article, we examine how a competition to find the world’s most accurate clock
might be run. How could the winning clock be identified if it outperforms every existing standard
for timing? The intuitive view on time-keeping is that a good clock is one that keeps time consis-
tently and hence agrees with other clocks. This view, we argue, is mistaken. Measurement is funda-
mentally about making high-quality predictions. Accordingly, the goal is not consistency, but
independence between the clock and its environment. We propose that, counter-intuitively, the best
clock is the one that ticks most unpredictably, making its predictions the most difficult to beat.
The organizers of the clock competition should award the prize to the clock that ticks most
randomly.VC 2016 Physics Essays Publication. [http://dx.doi.org/10.4006/0836-1398-29.4.574]
Re´sume´: Dans cet article, nous re´fle´chissons a` la manie`re d’organiser un concours pour couronner
l’horloge la plus pre´cise du monde. Comment peut-on identifier l’horloge gagnante si elle surpasse
tous les standards de mesure en vigueur? La de´finition habituelle est qu’une bonne horloge mesure
le temps de manie`re cohe´rente, et par conse´quent en accord avec d’autres horloges. Nous argumen-
tons pourquoi nous pensons que ce point de vue est errone´. La mesure du temps consiste fondamen-
talement a` faire des pre´visions de haute qualite´. Par conse´quent, le but n’est pas la cohe´rence en
soi, mais l’inde´pendance entre l’horloge et l’environnement dans lequel elle ope`re. Nous proposons
que la meilleure horloge soit celle dont le tic-tac est le plus impre´visible, ce qui rend ses pre´dictions
les plus difficiles a` battre. Par conse´quent, les organisateurs du concours de pre´cision devraient
attribuer leur prix a` celui qui peut construire l’horloge qui fait tic-tac de la manie`re la plus ale´atoire
possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Why make measurements? Intuitively, people make
measurements because measurements are useful. But what is
it about measurements that make them useful? How could
their value be justified to, say, an uncontacted tribe that has
never thought of using measurements before?
When I ask a question such as “how long is this desk?” I
can already see the desk in front of me, so its length is appar-
ent. For example, I can stretch my arms from one end of the
desk to the other and even feel how long it is. Yet this is not
particularly useful. What I want to know in asking this ques-
tion is how this length compares to the length of other
objects: measurement is not about evaluating a single object
in isolation, but about comparing things together. Wittgen-
stein1 makes a pertinent observation, highlighting the mean-
inglessness of measurement without comparison:
"Imagine someone saying: ’But I know how tall I am!’
and laying his hand on top of his head to prove it."
So, what is the value of relating things together? Tal2
examines this question and suggests that at the heart of
measurement-related activities lies the goal of prediction.
When I measure the length of my desk I am effectively
making a prediction about what will happen when it interacts
with other measured objects (e.g., will my desk fit through
that door?) Even if we imagine cases where measurement is
carried out for its own sake, without any explicit expecta-
tions for prediction, the concept of reliable relationships still
applies. For example, somebody who measures how fast
they run around a race track expects those timings to enable
comparisons involving other runners, suggesting who would
win a hypothetical race between them. In sum, measurement
readings can be regarded as predictions about the readings
that would be elicited in different measurement contexts.
Measuring my desk at 1.17meters on Monday allows me to
predict that, were I to measure my desk on Tuesday,
Wednesday or Thursday I would obtain a readingb) of
1.17meters (though, as we will see, this idealized assump-
tion does not always hold).
a)pmaguire@cs.nuim.ie
b)When we refer to a measurement “reading” in this article we are referring
to the final outcome of the process of measurement. For example, metrolo-
gists can often enhance the accuracy of indications taken from a particular
measurement instrument through theoretical corrections, which “analyze
away” some of the bias. We are referring to the end result of this multi-stage
process, to the value which represents the best attempt at discerning an unbi-
ased measurement.
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In order for measurements to support accurate predic-
tions, they must describe properties that are independent of
other environmental variables. This independence allows a
simplified abstracted model of the property to be developed,
without needing to worry about the context in which the
measurements were taken. This abstraction provides a very
useful tool for negotiating the world. For example, I can
measure my desk and use that measurement to predict
whether the desk will fit through a given doorway, without
needing to worry about what day of the week I am going
to move it. If I measure my desk on Monday, and my
office door on Tuesday, I expect to be able to relate the two
measurements directly, despite the fact they were made on
separate days: a reliable measurement of length should be
independent of the day on which it was made.
If objects did not have certain properties which stood out
as being independent of the environment, then measurement
would not be possible. No generalization or abstract model-
ing would be possible, thus rendering prediction impossible:
the world would appear as an inseparable chaos of complex-
ity. Luckily for us, properties such as distance, time, and
mass appear to stand out as being independent of the context
in which they are measured, allowing predictions to be made
about how objects will interact along these dimensions. The
goal of measurement becomes that of identifying standards
which achieve the greatest possible level of independence
between measurement process and measurement context, a
goal which occupies practitioners of the discipline known as
“metrology.”
II. METROLOGY
Metrology is the science of measurement and standardi-
zation, carried out by metrologists, who are experts in highly
accurate and precise measurement. Professional metrologists
are tasked with the job of maintaining, disseminating and
refining high-quality standards. Under the guidance of the
Bureau International de Poids et Mesures (BIPM), a world-
wide network of metrological institutions is responsible for
constantly comparing and adjusting standards to maximize a
property known as “stability.”3
Stability refers to the tendency of an apparatus to pro-
duce the “same” measurement outcome over repeated runs,
as well as replicating the outcomes of similar instruments
around the globe. Ideally, measurement readings should not
be associated in any way with the location or moment in
which they are taken. Standardization can be regarded as a
process for ensuring independent agreement: despite being
displaced in space and time, and having no causal interaction
with each other, metrological laboratories can produce
results which agree with each other. Under the guidance of
the BIPM, a worldwide network of metrological institutions
is responsible for comparing, adjusting, maintaining, dissem-
inating, and refining these stable standards.3
One of the notable successes of these institutions is the
standard measure of time used in almost every scientific con-
text, known as Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).3 UTC is
regarded as overwhelmingly stable insofar as a variety of
standardization labs around the world manage to closely
reproduce it on an ongoing basis. In practice, what this
means is that they are able to make highly accurate predic-
tions about how independent dispersed clocks will behave in
different circumstances across the globe each day.
A. Measurement error
The stability of UTC is a reflection of its very low
predictive error, otherwise known as “measurement error.”
Metrologists identify two types of measurement error,
namely, statistical error and systematic error.
Statistical error is the type of predictive uncertainty
which exists between a single measurement and the average
of a larger group of measurements. In other words, it is the
type of uncertainty which can be reduced by taking many
measurements and averaging them, rather than relying on a
single one.
The foot, for instance, is an ancient unit of length based
on the human body. As we know from experience, human
feet vary in length: one person’s foot only predicts the length
of another person’s foot to a limited degree of precision. In
response, medieval surveyors came up with an ingenious
idea. They would line up 16 randomly selected people, mea-
sure the combined length of their feet, and divide the total
into 16 foot-long segments.4 A 16-way average predicts
another 16-way average much more precisely than a single
foot predicts another single foot (the expected deviation is
reduced by 75%). This is an early example of a powerful
technique for reducing statistical error that statisticians refer
to as “aggregation.”
The other type of error, known as “systematic error,” is
the type of uncertainty which cannot be reduced by aggrega-
tion. Systematic errors cannot be detected through statistical
analysis of repeated measurements, because they remain sta-
ble under repetitions. An example of a systematic error in
the case of the medieval foot would be if the 16 people
chosen to line up were not random samples of the popula-
tion. For instance, just taking the 16 people in closest prox-
imity might result in 16 adolescents or 16 women being used
to estimate the foot length. Increasing the sample to 32 or 64
in this case would not improve the accuracy, because the
error is due to a lack of diversity in the sample, not the size
of the sample.
So how do metrologists estimate how much systematic
error is present in a measurement? In this article, we advance
a novel and counter-intuitive claim: We propose that the best
indicator of low systematic uncertainty is high-quality statis-
tical uncertainty.
B. Statistical uncertainty is desirable
Statistical uncertainty is a intrinsic feature of repeated
sampling enshrined by the law of large numbers. According
to this theorem, the average of a repeated set of measure-
ments will always result in an improvement in precision, no
matter how precise the underlying standard. For instance, in
the medieval foot example, measuring 32 feet would provide
a more precise measurement standard than using 16 feet,
while 64 would be better again. Similarly, while super-
precise UTC is currently based on approximately 400 atomic
Physics Essays 29, 4 (2016) 575
clocks scattered around the world,3 using 1000 clocks would
be even better. The presence of statistical uncertainty should
therefore not be viewed as a weakness: the issue of larger
groups of measurements being superior to smaller groups of
measurements is intrinsic to the concept of repeatable mea-
surement. In contrast, a lack of statistical uncertainty implies
a lack of informativeness such as, for instance, when a clock
stops ticking and always shows the same time. In the absence
of statistical uncertainty, no useful information can be
derived.
Furthermore, the magnitude of statistical uncertainty is
irrelevant to measurement stability as any required level of
precision can be achieved by repeating the same measure-
ment enough times and aggregating the results. According to
the law of large numbers, the average of a large number of
independent trials should tend toward an expected value,
with the level of deviation falling with the square root of the
number of trials. Thus, if a set of measurements reflects a
level of statistical uncertainty that is unsatisfactory, those
measurements can simply be repeated a thousand or a
million times (whatever is needed) and the average taken.
Assuming that the possibility of unrestricted repeated
measurement is available, then the magnitude of statistical
uncertainty for individual measurements is irrelevant.
In sum, it is inappropriate to regard statistical uncer-
tainty as a source of inaccuracy: statistical uncertainty is
desirable. Rather than minimizing statistical uncertainty,
we propose that the goal of metrology is instead to mini-
mize systematic uncertainty, leaving only statistical uncer-
tainty behind. The ideal measurement standard is one
whose quality can only be enhanced through further aggre-
gation, and not by any other means. In other words, the
ideal measurement standard is one whose uncertainty is
purely statistical. When systematic uncertainty is
decreased, the remaining uncertainty in a measurement
standard becomes more and more statistical in nature,
making the deviation between individual measurements
appear more and more random.
Returning to the example of the medieval foot, we know
intuitively that this measurement standard is weak and unre-
liable. However, the weakness of the standard does not stem
from the fact that people’s feet vary in length (statistical
uncertainty). We have argued that unpredictable variations
in individual measurements are actually a good thing.
Instead, the weakness of the medieval foot standard stems
from the fact that, first, it is awkward to assemble large num-
bers of people, and, more importantly, it is difficult to assem-
ble random samples of people (systematic uncertainty). The
problem with the system is not that human feet vary
in length, but that the system is unscalable and prone to
systematic bias.
C. The link between stability and randomness
Measurement standards with low systematic uncertainty
(a.k.a. stability) demonstrate high statistical uncertainty
(a.k.a. randomness). We can thus say that stability and ran-
domness are effectively the same concept, separated only by
repeated measurements.
This link is evident in the practice of metrology. For
example, the BIPM currently defines the second as the
duration of 9,192,361,770 cycles of radiation from the
caesium-133 atom. Hyperfine atomic transitions are the most
unpredictable event currently known to science, as enshrined
by the highly successful theory of quantum mechanics. Each
transition within the caesium-133 atom occurs at an entirely
unpredictable (i.e., random) moment. The stability of atomic
transition as a measurement standard is evidenced by its
independence from all other earthly events. Given this link
between stability and randomness, it is perhaps not a
co-incidence that the same person, over the same three-
month period in 1905, discovered that atomic photoemission
provides both an immutable source of randomness in the
form of individual photons (the quantum photoelectric
effect) and, at the same time, immutable stability derived
from a large aggregated set of emitted photons (the constant
speed of light).
Any accurate measurement standard can be used to pro-
duce randomness (and vice versa). For example, computers
generate high-quality randomness by measuring the drift
between two internal clocks. The more stable the clocks, the
higher the quality of the randomness in their drift. In the
same way, randomness could be derived from the drift in rel-
ative weight of the copies of the International Prototype
Kilogram (IPK), which are distributed around the world. The
greater the stability of the copies, the more random (i.e.,
unpredictable) the drift between them will be (and vice
versa).
The link between randomness and stability is also
enshrined by Algorithmic Information Theory (AIT),5 the
discipline which unites theoretical computer science and
information theory. The fundamental premise of AIT con-
cerns the equivalence between likelihood and simplicity, or,
in other words, between prediction and randomness. The
idea of predicting sequences using compressed descriptions
was first formulated by Solomonoff, who showed in 1964
that, for any predictable sequence of data, the optimal pre-
diction of the next item converges quickly with the predic-
tion made by the model which has the shortest description.
Compressing a set of data is equivalent to removing patterns
from it, and making the data more random.
Consider the following sequence: 4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 18, 20,
24… What number comes next? According to AIT, the best
prediction is made by the hypothesis that is as concise as
possible, in other words, as random as possible. The descrip-
tion “go up in an alternating pattern of þ2, þ4, skip the þ4
if the number is a 6” is an unwieldy one, hence its prediction
of 26 is low-quality. In contrast, the description “odds
primes þ1” is a well-compressed one, hence its prediction
of 30 is high-quality. Vitya´nyi and Li6 show that data com-
pression is almost always the best strategy, both in hypothe-
sis identification and prediction. The more “random” the
encoding of a hypothesis, the better the predictions it
makes.
But why? In a nutshell, it has to do with independence.
If we look at the unwieldy hypothesis, we can see it is
“overfitted.” There seems to be a relationship between the
hypothesis and the sequence that it is intended to explain.
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It looks as if somebody has crafted the hypothesis to fit the
data that is visible. The two are not independent.
In contrast, the compressed hypothesis has had all the
systematic patterns sucked out of it, leaving it statistically
random. Because its encoding is close to random, there can
be no connection remaining between the hypothesis and the
sequence it is intended to describe. The model and data are
independent, hence the prediction the model makes is more
valid. Randomness acts like a guarantee of independence:
phenomena which look random are likely to be independent,
because they have no causal connections with the context in
which they appear.
While working on nuclear weapons projects at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory in 1946, Stanislaw Ulam and
John von Neumann realized the importance of high-quality
randomness for making predictions. Essentially, they wanted
to “measure” an aspect of their nuclear model such as “will
the neutrons breach the radiation shielding or not?” They ini-
tially found that they were unable to make predictions using
conventional, deterministic mathematical methods, because
the calculations were too complex. What they decided to
do instead was to simulate random experiments, a novel
technique they referred to as “the Monte Carlo method.”
Although each result of a Monte Carlo simulation fea-
tures statistical uncertainty, this uncertainty can be reduced
by running more trials, so it is not a problem. Instead, the
key to the success of the Monte Carlo method is ensuring
that each simulation is independent of all the others, mitigat-
ing any systematic bias. Ulam and von Neumann wanted to
run different, independent simulations, each making different
mistakes, thus supporting a diversified overall perspective
through aggregation. What they wanted to avoid was running
different simulations, each making the same mistake (i.e.,
featuring systematic bias). The way to meet this criterion
was to use high-quality randomness, thus ensuring the inde-
pendence of successive trials, and yielding an accurate
measurement.
Von Neumann struggled to find enough randomness
to simulate the nuclear explosions, so he began using pseu-
dorandom numbers, such as those produced using the
middle-square method. The risk of using pseudorandomness
rather than “true” randomness is that it raises the spectre of
systematic bias: there might happen to be some relationship
between the middle-square method and modeling nuclear
explosions which would yield a type of uncertainty undimin-
ished by repeated simulations. This would have led him to
make the wrong predictions about the functioning of the
hydrogen bomb.
In sum, Von Neumann needed a source of randomness
to “illuminate” the properties of his bomb model in the same
way that we need random photons to illuminate the length of
a desk, random Caesium transitions to time the length of a
second, or a random sample of voters to measure which poli-
tician will win the election. Randomness is the hallmark of
independence between a property being measured and the
context in which it appears: it is what allows us to reliably
detach one property of an object from its other properties.
Hence, we will argue, the most stable measurement standard
is the one which behaves most randomly.
D. Measuring a desk
Let us explore this link between stability and random-
ness further, and show how it differs from common intuition
in practice.
Intuitively, a measurement device is stable if it always
produces the same reading when applied to the same object.
For example, if I measure the width of my desk and obtain a
reading of 1.17m, then I expect to obtain the same reading if
I re-measure it at any point in the future. This consistency,
however, is not sufficient for stability. It may turn out that
the measuring device is simply stuck on the reading of
1.17m, and gives the same result for any measurement. In
this case, the reading is simply uninformative and useless,
lacking any statistical uncertainty.
Even when a measuring device gives different readings
for different objects, and gives consistent readings for any
given object, this is not sufficient for inferring stability.
Imagine, for example, that my desk is located in a very hot
room. Whenever I bring the measuring device into the room,
the device expands significantly due to the heat, meaning
that the reading of 1.12m which it gives is too low. If I
moved the desk to a cooler room and measured it again, I
would obtain a reading of, say, 1.17m. Thus, the measuring
device is being affected by an external factor which is not an
intrinsic property of the desk, namely, ambient temperature.
The reading is thus incomplete. It is not the desk that has
a width of 1.12m, but rather “the width of the desk when
located in a room with temperature 34 C”. The fact that the
measuring device fails to report the temperature in which
readings have been taken means that a vital piece of informa-
tion needed for accurate prediction is being left out. The
omission of this contextual information is what we mean
when we say the reading is unstable: the measurement read-
ings are not fully independent of temperature. We have not
succeeded in detaching the width of the desk from its back-
ground context.
In practice, an unstable measurement standard is one
whose predictions a competitor can better. For example, if
my desk is being moved through a building with different
temperatures, and I have measured it at 1.12m in width, then
I expect it to fit through a doorway that is 1.15m in width.
However, if the doorway happens to be in a cooler part of
the building, then my prediction will be incorrect. An oppo-
nent using a measurement standard that controls for tempera-
ture context can make better predictions, objectively
demonstrating the superiority of his standard: whereas I
make mistakes, he gets it right every time. His standard
achieves greater independence between measurement read-
ing and measurement context, leading to better predictions.
The problem with a measurement device whose readings
vary with heat is that it introduces an association between
measurement outcome and the process of measuring. When I
measure my desk it is always located in the same room, with
a temperature of 34 C. I believe that I am taking separate
independent measurements of the desk, thus the consistency
of the readings of 1.17m delude me into thinking that the
device is stable. But consistency is not equivalent to stabil-
ity: my predictions turn out to be wrong. The consistency I
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observed was due to consistent contexts, not the stability of
the measurement device across diverse contexts.
Rather than fixating on consistency, stability is better
defined in terms of competitive success. What we want is for
our measurements to support predictions that are hard to
beat. The purer the statistical uncertainty evident in individ-
ual measurements (i.e., the more random they are), the
harder it is for that measurement standard to be upstaged by
competitors seeking to expose residual systematic error.
E. Overthrowing the krypton-86 standard
When a measurement standard is shown to be exploit-
able by competitors, it violates the assumption of indepen-
dence between measurement readings and measurement
context, and the standard is superseded. This “dethroning” is
manifested as a failure of expected randomness.
The krypton standard for length, for example, was super-
seded by the current light-based definition in 1975, after its
shortcomings were revealed by the enhanced stability of the
wavelength of light emitted from a methane-stabilized
helium-neon laser. Physicists using the laser were able to
make predictions about the deviation of measurement read-
ings carried out using krypton-86 lamps. The lamp-users
believed the deviation of their readings to be random, that is,
exhibiting pure statistical uncertainty. The laser-users, how-
ever, revealed a predictable bias in measurement reading
depending on which point of the krypton-86 orange line was
selected to standardize length. Because the 1960 krypton
standard made no reference to choosing any particular point
of the line, the existence of such systematic bias could not be
expressed using the old definition.
The objective failure of independence between measure-
ment reading and measurement context, as demonstrated
through objectively superior predictions, is what led to the
adoption in 1975 of the current light-based standard for
length. The speed of light, derived from a large aggregated
set of individually unpredictable photons, is grounded on a
source of randomness so strong that it is embedded into the
bedrock of physics. Anyone challenging the current BIPM
standards for length or time will have to demonstrate that
quantum events are not truly random. The ostensible diffi-
culty of this task is what secures the stability of the current
BIPM standards.
III. THE CLOCK COMPETITION
With these ideas in place, we can now turn our attention
to how to identify the world’s most accurate clock.
The Longitude Act was passed in July 1714, offering
monetary rewards for anyone who could find a simple and
practical method for the accurate determination of a ship’s
longitude. The bulk of the prize money was eventually
claimed by John Harrison for his invention of the marine
chronometer, revolutionizing long-distance sea travel. In this
spirit, let us consider a similar competition, this time to
develop a clock more accurate than any clock ever yet built.
How would the winner of the competition be identified?
In the case of longitude, the proof required for winning
the prize is immediately obvious: the system should enable
ships to undertake long sea trips successfully. But in the case
of the clock competition, how do we tell if a clock is ticking
more accurately than any other clock on earth? What is it
that timing is supposed to achieve? How do we recognize
when the current standard for accuracy has been superseded?
In 1967, atomic time replaced ephemeris time as the
standard for time. Up until then it had seemed as if the rota-
tion of the celestial spheres was independent of any other
events transpiring on earth. However, when Caesium atomic
clocks became operational in 1955, it was quickly confirmed
that, instead, the rotation of the earth fluctuates predictably
relative to atomic transitions. For example, the particular day
that we choose to measure a mean solar second can affect
the reading we get, as predicted by the atomic second. Due
to the presence of these predictable patterns, the mean solar
second became unsuitable for carrying out the most accurate
measurements. The goal of metrology is to deliver measure-
ment readings that are as independent as possible from the
context of measurement. Hence, the ideal source of timing is
one whose fluctuations are unrelated to anything else on
earth, or indeed, the universe.
As previously discussed, a common intuition regarding
time is that clock accuracy can be defined purely in terms of
readings consistently agreeing with each other. If my watch
reads the same as your watch, and so does everybody else’s
watch, then this makes a pretty good case that we all have
the right time.
This is acceptable if we are all synchronizing our
watches to a more reliable source, but when it comes to set-
ting the standard itself, the idea is flawed. Consider, for
example, a set of supposedly accurate clocks that are placed
into a vault. After 10 years this set of clocks is removed
and found to still be ticking in perfect synchrony. This obser-
vation alone cannot be interpreted as evidence of stability.
The clocks might all be making the same mistake, or as Witt-
genstein puts it: “As if someone were to buy several copies
of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was
true.”1
For instance, the clocks might have a sensitive tempera-
ture detecting device that is capable of discerning night from
day in the vault. At the coldest point of the night, they all
reset to 00:00:00 midnight. Thus, what the clocks are agree-
ing on is the coldest moment of the previous night, not the
passage of time over the last 10 years. What is needed to
infer stability is evidence that the clocks are not simply mak-
ing the same mistake (i.e., dependence on, or sensitivity to,
some contextual influence which cannot be relied on to apply
across all measurement contexts). Accordingly, the thing we
need to focus on is not the extent to which clocks agree,
but the manner in which they differ. What we want is for
deviations in their behavior to be hard to anticipate. We want
the clock drifts to demonstrate high-quality statistical
uncertainty.
A. Running the competition
How can we identify a winner of the clock competition,
without the verifying authority having to spend huge
amounts of money on testing, and running the risk of having
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competitors complain that the testing procedure was not fair
or reliable? We propose that the most objective mechanism
for identifying stability is to allow competitors to test each
other’s clocks and reach agreement among themselves.
We propose that the one thing that competitors will
agree on is prediction. Let each competitor build a pair of
clocks. Now, challenge them to predict the ticking of each
other’s clocks. Given a pair of clocks, which will tick first,
clock A or clock B? (or, if that period is too brief to witness,
which clock will be the first to tick, say, a billion times?) At
chance, competitors have a 50% possibility of guessing right.
However, if their understanding of time is superior then they
can push these odds higher than 50%. Multiple repeats of the
game quickly reveal who is making predictions above
chance. The pair of clocks whose divergence is most difficult
to predict (i.e., most random) is the winner; this is the clock
with the purest form of statistical uncertainty and, hence, the
lowest amount of systematic uncertainty. All competitors
will agree on who the winner is, because the losers always
get beaten in this game, despite their best efforts.
The clock competition thought experiment illustrates
that measurement is an objective endeavour. For instance,
the notion of timing stability is not something which is
defined by any one institution: the BIPM do not have a set of
arbitrary tests that a hyper-accurate clock should pass, on
which other metrological institutions might potentially
disagree. Instead, stability is grounded by an unrestricted
competition to out-predict one’s opponents by any means
available. When a new, more accurate clock is built, it is
easy to demonstrate this fact objectively by out-predicting
everybody else. The most accurate clock is the one whose
ticking is most random (i.e., more independent of measure-
ment context than anyone else’s clock). Measurement is not
a theoretical issue that is subject to debate: it is a practical
issue, with immediately overt consequences that everyone
can appreciate.
If we are dissatisfied with the precision of the winning
clock’s ticking, we can reduce its statistical uncertainty to
any level by cloning the clock. For example, we can build a
million independent copies of the clock and define the sec-
ond as the period of time it takes for 500,000 of those clocks
to tick. Given a source of pure statistical uncertainty, there
are no limits to the level of precision that can be achieved.
B. A common misunderstanding
The idea that randomness is the key to stability is very
surprising. Intuitively, we think that a clock is accurate
because it is in synchrony with “ideal” time, whatever that
might be. We do not think that a clock is accurate because it
wobbles randomly. Indeed, a clock that ticks randomly
and unpredictably seems like the exact opposite of what is
desirable in a clock.
When the media reports on new atomic clocks that
improve on the accuracy of all existing clocks, it is common
to see headlines of the type “NEW CLOCK ACCURATE
TO WITHIN ONE SECOND IN A BILLION YEARS.”
What we do not see is headlines of the type “NEW CLOCK
TICKS UNPREDICTABLY.” And yet, the media focus on
consistency as a standard for timing is a mistake. The
everyday intuitive idea of judging the accuracy of our clocks
relative to a more reliable standard only makes sense if there
is a trusted source of authority. However, in the case of
the world’s most accurate clock, there is no more stable
standard. Relative to what will the new clock lose only one
second in a billion years? This seems to imply a comparison
between the new clock and an ideal clock. But no ideal is
available.
Assuming the drift represents statistical error, then the
purported “one second” slippage over a billion years could
be reduced to any arbitrary level (e.g., one millisecond; one
microsecond) by simply building multiple copies of this new
clock and taking the aggregated reading of the set. In this
case the media headline makes no sense. On the other hand,
if the drift represents systematic error, then it cannot be
quantified at all, because we do not know what the error is.
If prompted—what does this media headline actually
mean?—one might infer that, after a billion years, two of the
new atomic clocks are expected to only have a discrepancy
of one second between them. Yet, as previously discussed,
consistency does not imply stability. For example, a group of
farmers relying on a crude version of ephemeris time could
also be expected to agree within one second in a billion
years’ time: they simply look up at the sky and define
midday as the point when the sun is highest in the sky. In a
billion years everybody will still agree on exactly what time
midday is at, because they will all be looking at the same sun
in the same sky, making the same mistake. Hence, claiming
that a clock drifts one second in a billion years means
absolutely nothing.
When a new hyper-accurate clock is introduced, the only
claim it has to being more accurate than existing clocks is
that it can out-predict them. Because the old clocks cannot
predict the ticking of the new clock, the ticking of the new
clock appears random relative to the old standard. Thus the
headline “NEW CLOCK TICKS UNPREDICTABLY” is the
appropriate one. Because there is no other reliable way to
judge the clock competition, there is no other possible way
of describing the winner of such a competition.
IV. CRITIQUE AND REBUTTAL
Given that the idea of the clock competition is so
counter-intuitive, we will now address it again from an alter-
native perspective, namely, by responding to a series of argu-
ments that a metrologist might raise.
Argument 1: The relationship between measurement
accuracy and predictability is the inverse of what is claimed
in this paper. The behavior of measurement standards need
not and must not be random. Indeed, the behavior of an
accurate measurement standard should be the easiest to
predict.
Rebuttal: No, this is an important mistake in thinking
about measurement. You cannot run a clock competition
based on which clock is easiest to predict (i.e., a stopped
watch), or whose behavior is most consistent. An atomic
clock makes great predictions about the behavior of a
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humble wrist-watch, but it does not work the other way
around, and that’s what makes the atomic clock superior.
For example, a wrist-watch and an atomic clock are
going to slowly diverge in their timing. Wrist-watch adher-
ents will be completely clueless as to which direction this
divergence is going to move in. For them, it appears to
trace out a random walk: if they gamble money on it, they
are going to lose. Atomic clock adherents, on the other
hand, have a much deeper understanding of time. They can
model how the flaws in a quartz crystal vary with environ-
mental context, and hence predict exactly how the wrist-
watch is going to behave in its drift. Atomic clock behavior
appears random relative to wrist-watch behavior, while
wrist-watch behavior is predictable relative to atomic clock
behavior. Because the atomic clock is less predictable, its
users will win the clock competition every time. The best
measurement standards are those whose behavior is hardest
to predict, making them resistant to modeling.
Remember, randomness is relative. In a nutshell: if A
outpredicts B, then A appears random (i.e., unpredictable)
relative to B. If a given clock is capable of predicting
worldly events, then the behavior of that clock will naturally
appear random relative to those worldly events. Hence, the
most accurate clock in the world is the one that behaves
most randomly from our naive perspective.
Argument 2: A crucial point of the existing literature
on metrology is that the accuracy of a measurement standard
is ultimately determined relative to a theoretical ideal rather
than relative to other measurement standards.
Rebuttal: No, this is another important mistake in
thinking about measurement. The whole point of the clock
competition is that there is no theoretical ideal available, so
measurement cannot possibly work in this way. Humans
have the intuition that measurement works like this, because
we are used to delegating responsibility to trusted authorities.
But when it comes to setting the standard, this intuition no
longer works. The most accurate clock in the world attains
its status not by matching an ideal, but by doing something
that no other system can do. Its behavior cannot be antici-
pated or justified in any way by external observers: it over-
throws every existing ideal. Instead, its superiority is
manifested in practice, by defeating all competitors.
If measurement was based on a theoretical ideal, who
would assume responsibility for setting the correct ideal?
And what would give them the authority to do so? The prob-
lem here is one of justification. Successful measurement is
not something that is decided by fiat. Instead, we need a
practical means of demonstrating superiority, one that goes
beyond theory, modeling and abstractions, one that every-
body can participate in, one that everybody agrees on. Pre-
diction is the objective process that meets that criterion.
Whoever makes the most accurate predictions will win
competitions in a manner that supports universal agreement.
Forget about comparisons with nonexistent theoretical
ideals, none of that matters. All that matters is winning.
Argument 3: The source of accuracy of caesium clocks
is not the randomness of the hyperfine atomic transition but
the fact that all caesium-133 atoms have (under ideal condi-
tions) the same frequency associated with that particular
transition. Caesium fountain clocks should ideally “tick” as
closely as possible to that frequency.
Rebuttal: This statement is riddled with weasel words
such as “same,” “closely,” and “frequency,” which set up
circularity.
For a start, what does it mean to claim that all caesium-
133 atoms have the same property? How do we know that?
What is the evidence? The only thing we can say is that it
seems very hard to tell caesium-133 atoms apart based on
their behavior. In other words, the behavior of caesium-133
atoms appears independent (i.e., unpredictable; random) rel-
ative to the environmental context in which they appear.
Stating that caesium-133 atoms are good for timing because
they are all the same is a circular argument, because it fails
to define how the property of “sameness” is established.
Instead, the genuine justification for using caesium-133
atoms is that, so far, their behavior has proved impossible to
predict.
The use of the word “frequency” is another weasel word,
because it assumes a pre-existing standard for time onto
which events can be projected (frequency is defined as the
rate per second of a vibration). Again, this harks back to
the human intuition to defer to a trusted authority. When the
standard for time itself is being set, the concept of frequency
does not yet exist and cannot be used as justification for
selecting a particular standard.
Finally, the assertion that caesium clocks should tick
as closely as possible to an ideal perfect frequency has no
practical implications. When we are setting the standard for
measurement, the concept of “closely” cannot be relied on as
a guide, since it is the very thing we are attempting to realize.
In practice, clocks tick closely when it is difficult to discrimi-
nate between them based on their behavior, in other words,
when they drift randomly from each other. The reason we use
atomic clocks is not because caesium-133 has some apodictic
God-given claim to stability, it is simply because atomic
clocks are, to date, winning the clock competition.
In sum, we need to abandon the intuitive justification of
unattainable ideal measurement standards just beyond the
horizon, and embrace the fact that metrology is a discipline
which delivers in practice. Measurement is ruthlessly objec-
tive, and this is what sets it apart from so many other kinds
of human activity. For example, in subjective disciplines
such as philosophy, a small elite group of practitioners
decides what counts as good and bad practice; as a result
much of the energy in the discipline is focused on behaving
in certain ways which meets with the approval of the elite.
Metrology is completely the opposite; it is the ultimate
objective discipline. When your measurements are inferior,
you make inferior predictions and you start losing straight
away, in a manner which is obvious to everyone. For this
reason, metrology does not rely on an elite group of practi-
tioners to dictate the kind of language that should be used,
or to determine how metrologists should behave. All that
matters is winning, by any means.
Better randomness always leads to better predictions.6
Hence, if we accept that measurement is about prediction,
then we also accept that a clock that ticks randomly is the
best clock in the world. There is no need for debate: if
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somebody found a way of building a clock that ticks more
randomly than any other existing clock, then all metrologists
would immediately abandon what they are doing and start
building that clock. The goal of the clock competition
thought experiment is to point out that measurement is fun-
damentally rooted in predictive success, and that predictive
success depends on the realization of randomness, which is
an infinitely difficult task.5
V. CONCLUSION
People have a mistaken intuition about measurement. In
everyday life we are used to adjusting our clocks to that of a
stronger authority on time, comparing the accuracy of our
tools to those that are even more reliable. This attitude leads
us to suppose that the route to stability is to identify immuta-
ble apodictic physical constants. This attitude toward mea-
surement is a mistake. The key to enhancing measurement
accuracy lies with understanding what it is that measurement
is supposed to achieve, and the process by which superior
measurements are recognized.
In this article, we have argued that, contrary to intuition,
measurement is not about eradicating uncertainty. Instead,
accurate measurement depends on having access to high-
quality statistical uncertainty: in order to achieve indepen-
dence between a measured property and its context, we must
identify and leverage a source of even purer uncertainty than
the one we are seeking to illuminate. The more random that
source, the more stable a foundation it provides for support-
ing predictions. For example, Stanislaw Ulam and John von
Neumann hunted out high-quality randomness and leveraged
it to reduce their uncertainty about the functioning of the
hydrogen bomb; they expressed one source of uncertainty in
terms of a stronger source of uncertainty, rendering a failure
of the hydrogen bomb equivalent to finding patterns in the
middle-square method.
Why does this seem so counter-intuitive? We are accus-
tomed to living in a world where most measurements are
“sloppy.” When I use a measuring tape, the things I measure
with it are often just as good at maintaining length as the
tape itself. For example, I could mark one meter on a stick,
and then use the stick as a tool to measure the length of other
objects. Here, the stick is just as effective as the original
tape. Because our ordinary standards do not exceed the accu-
racy of intuitive manifestations of constancy in the surround-
ing environment, we are easily led to believe in the notion of
an ideal “objective reality.” We naively assume that the goal
of measurement is to match the consistency of this objective
reality.
For example, we do not have a pair of suns, only a single
sun, so there is no obvious means of quantifying the random-
ness of its timing drift, as per the clock competition. Before
the invention of atomic clocks, a time-keeping competition
would have been determined based merely on how closely
the competing clocks agreed with the sun. Because of this
natural source of timing authority, the connections between
stability, independence and randomness were, until recently,
hidden. Such connections only became apparent once mea-
surement capability transcended the efficacy of easily acces-
sible environmental standards.
At the limits of accuracy, the goal switches from that of
consistency (e.g., matching the accuracy of the sun), to
achieving independence between measurement readings and
measurement context. The more random (i.e., unpredictable)
the drift in individual measurement readings, the greater the
level of independence achieved, and the more successful the
associated predictions. Understanding the role of randomness
at the heart of measurement is the first step toward abandon-
ing the flawed notion of an ideal objective reality.
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